The city in which the directory was organized in 1918. Directory. Simple operations with folders

Many users today quite often encounter the concept of a directory. Some people, when asked what a directory is, simply shrug their shoulders, not even realizing that any person working on a computer encounters them every day. Let's take a closer look at the essence of the issue.

What is a directory: computer terms

The word directory itself has many different meanings. In this case, we are talking specifically about computer systems and technologies, so we will start specifically from this direction.
In the modern age of information technology, the meaning of the word “directory” should be known to everyone. This concept can be interpreted as “folder” or “directory”. In other words, this is one of the fundamental components of the file system. This is a file organizing element.

File system and principles of organizing work with files

Directory or folder are quite tricky concepts. The thing is that this element is not physically present on the hard drive or other storage medium. This is the difference between folders and files with a size of zero. Thus, we can say that a directory is a virtual element. A folder that contains no files takes up no disk space at all. If there is something in it, then the virtual volume of disk memory will completely coincide with the size of all objects that are inside it. A special file that does not have an extension is responsible for the existence of the directory.

This file stores all information about objects, their quantity, creation date, size, etc. Thanks to the introduction of this element into everyday use, it became possible to organize files according to certain criteria. In other words, a folder as a file system makes it possible to group files. A comparison can be made with real life. A directory is essentially a kind of virtual box into which the user puts the necessary things. Thus, it turns out that documents are not scattered throughout the hard drive, although they are physically present on it, but are located in strictly defined places.

Thanks to such clear ordering, you can find the desired object in a matter of minutes. Folders may have different names. The simplest example is the standard “My Documents” directory. It is clear that the user will look for his own files here. Operating systems of the Windows family initially offer the user the use of specialized directories for storing a certain type of information, for example, “My videos”, “My music”. Of course, using these directories is not a requirement. But on the other hand, if you use these directories, you will always know where everything is.

How to view folders in file managers

The folders themselves can contain an unlimited number of files. They may also include subfolders. These elements are inserted like a nesting doll. The result is a kind of hierarchical structure, which is also called a tree structure. The simplest example is the standard Explorer program. The appearance of folders may differ significantly in other similar programs. Let's take, for example, Windows Commander. Here you can change the options for selecting files and folders. For example, you can view data as a table with options, tiles, lists, or large icons. Suppose the user sets an icon with notes for the “Music” folder. Thus, he will immediately determine that there is music here and not something else. Another benefit is that when displaying folders with nested subfolders, the directory will appear as a partially opened book. Instead of pages, this book will contain screenshots or even file page layouts.

Showing Hidden Objects

Some folders themselves are hidden from the user's eyes. Most often this concerns system directories. In the Windows operating system, this is done for security reasons so that the user does not accidentally delete important files that are responsible for the functioning of the entire system. To view such objects, you simply need to use the view menu. The option to show hidden folders and files should be enabled here.

Performing basic folder operations

You can perform almost all the same actions with directories as with files. The only exception is editing. You can copy, delete, rename, move folders, and create icons for them. Creating new directories is also not difficult. In the Explorer manager, to do this, just right-click on an empty workspace and call the corresponding command. This will create a new directory by default called "New Folder". This is, of course, not the only way. You can use the main menu commands, the Ctrl+Shift+N button combination, and special buttons on the panel. There are different methods for different file managers.

Site directories

With website directories, things are a little more complicated. The principle remains the same. The thing is that in this case, by directory we mean the directory in which the elements of the site being created or developed are stored. The root directory must have an index.html file. The Content and Images folders are also loaded here. It is not necessary to use these exact names. You can label the folders as you like. For example, names can be given according to headings in which materials on a specific topic will be posted. This approach can slightly increase the root directory itself. But in some cases, this approach can shorten the path to pages.

Quite often, many users come across the concept of a directory. Some, upon hearing the question: “What is a directory?”, shrug their shoulders in bewilderment, although every person who works with a computer encounters this every day. But let's look at the essence of the issue in a little more detail.

Computer terminology: a directory is...

In general, the word “directory” itself has many meanings. But, since in this case we are talking specifically about computer systems and technologies, we will start from this direction.

So, in the computer world, the meaning of the word “directory” is known to everyone, and the concept itself is interpreted as “directory” or “folder”. In other words, it is one of the fundamental components of the file system. Simply put, organizing files.

File system and principles of file organization

Simple operations with folders

Actually, with directories you can perform almost all actions related to files, with the exception of editing in the usual sense. They can be copied, deleted, moved, renamed, created icons, etc.

Creating directories is also not difficult. For example, in the same “Explorer” you just need to right-click on an empty area of ​​the work area and call the corresponding command. This will create a new directory called "New Folder" by default. Naturally, this is not the only way. You can use main menu commands, special panel buttons, or the standard combination Ctrl + Shift + N. In general, different file managers have their own methods.

Site directories

With the concept of “site directory” the situation is somewhat more complicated, although the principle of understanding the essence is almost the same. The fact is that in this case, a directory means a root directory in which all elements of a website being created or already created, for example in HTML, will be stored.

First of all, the file Index.html (main page) must be in the root directory, and the Content (for pages) and Images (for pictures) folders are also loaded there. However, it is not necessary to use these exact names. They can be designated as you like - for example, give names according to the headings in which materials on a certain topic will be placed. will increase the root directory itself, but in some cases it is due to this that you can shorten the path to the pages themselves.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above, a directory is a kind of container or, if you like, a box into which the necessary content is placed. And it is the directory that is one of the fundamental elements that allows you to clearly organize the file structure.

On September 22, 1918, at the Ufa State Conference of anti-Bolshevik groups and associations, the Directory’s personal composition of 5 people was formed as a body of temporary all-Russian power until the start of the activities of the Constituent Assembly, elected at the end of 1917. On September 23, at the final meeting of the forum, the “Act on the Formation of the All-Russian Supreme Power” was approved. At the same time, its existing members - N. D. Avksentyev, V. M. Zenzinov, V. G. Boldyrev, V. V. Sapozhnikov made a solemn promise:

“We, the members of the Provisional All-Russian Government, elected at the state meeting in the city of Ufa, solemnly promise to remain faithful to the people and the Russian state and to fulfill our duties in strict accordance with the act on the formation of the Supreme Power adopted at the State meeting” (1).

In domestic historiography there is no unity of views regarding the political results of the Conference from the standpoint of victory or defeat of the two main opposing groups in the “white” movement - the “democratic” counter-revolution led by the Socialist Revolutionaries and bourgeois-cadet circles. In passing, we note that the Directory was generally unlucky, and there are no special studies devoted to its history. Already in the wake of events, the results of the Ufa meeting began to be defined as a defeat for the Socialist Revolutionaries. “Messrs. Avksentyevs and Argunovs turned out to be just a toy in the hands of reactionary commercial, industrial and landowner circles and “allies.” They were some kind of pseudo-socialist patch on the moth-eaten monarchist mantle, which the allies and the counter-revolution were going to throw over the head of the Russian people,” wrote V. Kerzhentsev in September 1918 (2). And the Socialist Revolutionaries themselves, a little later, assessed their activities in Ufa in approximately the same way. “The decomposition of the party was in full swing and ended with the Ufa disgrace, where the party committed a complete betrayal of democracy, abandoning all those slogans in the name of which the working people of the Volga region and Siberia followed the party and shed their blood, and surrendering power to persons obviously incapable of maintaining democratic positions.” , - said the proclamation of the Central Bureau of the Siberian Union of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1919 (3). Based on these assessments, Soviet historiography affirms the victory at the State Conference of the “bourgeois reaction” led by the Cadets and the defeat of the Socialist Revolutionaries (4). Summarizing this point of view, V.V. Garmiza declared regarding the Directory:

“It was a typical bourgeois government, and the two right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries who were part of it did not change anything in its social essence and policy. By its own free will, and by no means yielding to outside pressure, the directory settled in Omsk and collaborated with the bourgeois Provisional Siberian Government” (5).

On the other hand, already from the 20s. receives citizenship from a point of view that qualifies the fact of the creation of the Directory as “a temporary and unstable compromise between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie (represented by the conciliatory parties)” (6). Moreover, N.G. Dumova proved that the attitude of the “winners”, i.e. The cadet leadership's response to the results of the meeting was purely negative (7). In order to understand what happened in Ufa on September 8 - 23, 1918, it is necessary to carefully look at the personal composition of the Directory from the point of view of party affiliation, socio-political views, business characteristics, and also to establish who gave in and by how much, based on from preliminary plans.

The composition of the Provisional All-Russian Government was as follows (the names of deputies or backups are in brackets): N. D. Avksentyevsky (1878 - 1943) (A. A. Argunov (1866 - 1939), N. V. Tchaikovsky (1850 - 1926) (B M. Zenzinov (1880 - 1953), N. I. Astrov (1868 - 1934) (V. A. Vinogradov (1874 -?), V. G. Boldyrev (1875 - after 1932) M. V. Alekseev (1857 - 1918), P.V. Vologodsky (1863 - 1928) (V.V. Sapozhnikov (1861 - 1924). Pairs were selected on the principle of political compatibility, since it was not clear who would be among the five directors. So, at the time the creation of an authority outside the territory controlled by anti-Soviet forces in eastern Russia were N. V. Tchaikovsky, N. I. Astrov, M. V. Alekseev. The latter died in Yekatirinodar on October 8. P. V. Vologodsky negotiated in the Far East Therefore, the Directory began to operate consisting of N. D. Avksentyev (pres.), V. M. Zenzinov, V. A. Vinogradov, V. G. Boldyrev, V. V. Sapozhnikov. The latter was replaced on October 19 by P., who returned to Omsk V. Vologodsky. This circumstance allows us to assert the preliminary agreement on the personal composition of the Provisional All-Russian Government (VVP) before the Meeting, primarily between the Union of the Revival of Russia (SVR) and the National Center.

Of the listed “ten”, N.D. Avksentyev, V.M. Zenzinov, A.A. Argunov, who were prominent functionaries of the AKP (the first two members of the Central Committee, all three deputies of the Constituent Assembly), had a clear party affiliation; N. I. Astrov and V. A. Vinogradov, members of the Central Committee of the PNS and member of the Central Committee of the TSNP. N.V. Tchaikovsky. The question arises about the political orientation of P.V. Vologodsky, V.V. Sapozhnikov and the general. V. G. Boldyreva. Their party affiliation influences the determination of the political orientation of the Directory. Thus, according to A. A. Anson, it consisted of two cadets (V. V. Sapozhnikov, V. A. Vinogradov), two Socialist Revolutionaries (N. D. Avksentyev, V. M. Zenzinov) and the non-party V. G. Boldyrev ( 8). A different combination is proposed by G. Z. Ioffe: “Since Boldyrev still gravitated toward the Socialist-Revolutionaries,” he writes, “and Vologodsky toward the Cadets, the balance of forces in the Directory can be regarded as 3: 2 in favor of the Socialist-Revolutionary or pro-Socialist Revolutionary orientation” (9). N. G. Dumova characterizes V. V. Sapozhnikov as “a cadet close to the regionalists” and reasonably denies P. V. Vologodsky membership in the cadets (10). M.E. Plotnikova, V.V. Garmiza categorically deny the involvement of the head of the Provisional Siberian Government (VSP) ever in the Socialist Revolutionary Party (11). G.Z. Ioffe qualifies him as a half-cadet - half-Socialist-Revolutionary (12). Yu. V. Zhurov is close to him, considering the named person “a cadet in political views, who before the revolution was aligned with the right-wing socialist-revolutionaries” (13). The monograph by V. A. Demidov provides convincing facts indicating that he belongs to the Social Revolutionaries (14).

Now let’s try to understand the party affiliation of the “controversial” members of the Directory. According to the data we collected (15), P.V. Vologodsky on the eve and during the revolution of 1905–1907. was one of the organizers and members of the Tomsk Socialist Revolutionary organization, was elected to the 2nd State Duma, and was a member of the Socialist Revolutionary faction (16). Regarding his party affiliation at the time in question, the director and chairman of the VSP stated the following: “You know that I once belonged to the S.-Rov party. Now, of course, it cannot be said that I completely remained a supporter of this party, but in my soul I remained the same democrat as other intellectuals. I have never been too partisan” (17).

Professor V.V. Sapozhnikov, according to L.M. Kolomytseva, in 1906 was a member of the bureau of the Tomsk department of the PNS (18). In 1918 he was a non-party member. At least nothing is said about his political beliefs in the official biography (19). We have no information about his involvement with the regionalists. Lieutenant General V. G. Boldyrev was “close” (N. G. Dumova) or “gravitated” (G. Z. Ioffe) to the right Socialist Revolutionaries (20) on the basis of belonging to the “Union for the Revival of Russia” (SVR), from whose name he performed in Ufa (21). It is necessary to dispel the myth about the origin of the general from a poor peasant family living in the city of Syzran (22). The very fact that a poor peasant family was in a fairly large commercial and industrial city is questionable. As V.D. Wegman established, the father of the future member of the Directory was engaged in blacksmithing, and his mother “owned small brick sheds” (23). Apparently, his father was the owner of a forge, which allowed the future general to graduate from the surveying school in Penza and then enter the St. Petersburg Military Topographical School. His affiliation with the SVR is noteworthy, since the latter united not only representatives of petty-bourgeois parties and associations, but also cadets - N. I. Astrov, N. M. Kishkin, D. N. Shakhovsky and others. Active figures became members of the Provisional All-Russian Government associations: N. D. Avksentyev, N. V. Tchaikovsky, N. I. Astrov, V. G. Boldyrev and it was this that formulated the idea of ​​​​forming a temporary government - a directory headed by a “military dictator”. Thus, in 1918, P.V. Vologodsky, V.V. Sapozhnikov, V.G. Boldyrev were non-party members.

A kind of key to understanding the principles of nominating directors is the personality of V. A. Vinogradov, a lawyer from Siberia, deputy of the 3rd and 4th State Dumas, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party. The fact is that in the cadet headquarters he was part of the left wing, headed by N.V. Nekrasov and who advocated rapprochement with right-wing socialist parties and the creation of a bloc in the Duma with the Mensheviks and Trudoviks (24). Members of the VVP turned out to be people inclined to compromise, who had lost their clear party affiliation, who had moved away from party orthodoxy like P.V. Vologodsky. It is not for nothing that V. G. Boldyrev characterized the Directory as follows: “The elected composition of the Directory seemed moderate-democratic. Even its left wing, Tchaikovsky and Avksentyev, were very moderate socialists” (25) In general, members of the GDP were their political sympathies. N. D. Avksentyev, V. M. Zenzinov, V. A. Vinogradov, V. G. Boldyrev, P. V. Vologodsky were related as follows:

• two Social Revolutionaries;
• one cadet who stands in coalition positions with right-wing socialist parties;
• one non-party member who was once a member of the AKP;
• one career military man.

All figures of the Directory were at the age of political maturity (from 38 for V. M. Zenzinov to 55 for P. V. Vologodsky and 57 for V. V. Sapozhnikov) and had higher education. Among them were two lawyers (V.A. Vinogradov and P.V. Vologodsky), two professors (V.G. Boldyrev and V.V. Sapozhnikov), two philosophers (V.M. Zenzinov and N.D. Avksentyev, and the latter received the title of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the German city of Halle). All had rich life experience and, very importantly, with the exception of N.D. Avksentyev, were closely connected with Siberia. V.V. Sapozhnikov, P.V. Vologodsky, V.A. Vinogradov were either born or spent most of their lives here, V.M. Zenzinov twice in 1906–1907, 1910–1914. served exile in Yakutia. All had practical experience in leadership activities. Thus, N.D. Avksentyev was the Minister of Internal Affairs in the Provisional Government from the end of July 1917 (until September 2), V.A. Vinogradov in 1917 became deputy to the Minister of Railways N.V. Nekrasov, V.G. Boldyrev was then appointed commander of the army, V. M. Zenzinov was elected to the executive committee of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. P.V. Vologodsky, who did not show himself to be anything significant in 1917, headed the Provisional Siberian Government on July 1, 1918.

From the point of view of the realities of September 1918, the composition of the GDP in practice personified the Socialist Revolutionary idea of ​​a coalition of socialist parties under the leadership of the AKP. In addition, the created power formally met the right’s demands for “complete unity of all outstanding forces, without regard to which party he belongs to and which god he prays to,” formulated by A. V. Adrianov (26).

Now let’s look at the results of the Ufa State Conference, or rather at the “Act on the Formation of the Provisional All-Russian Authority” adopted as such from the standpoint of the plans and actual state of affairs of the main political groupings that participated in it. The delegate body of the forum was distinguished by two features: the predominance of the Socialist Revolutionaries (more than 100 out of 142 people) and the leading position of two delegations - the Samara Komuch and the Omsk Provisional Siberian Government. “The debate, in essence, took place between two real forces,” notes G. Z. Ioffe, “on the one hand, Komuch, defending the Socialist-Revolutionary and largely union-revival point of view, and on the other, the Provisional Siberian Government, which generally expressed the “concept” "National Center" (27).

It seems to us that the state of affairs was somewhat different. Indeed, Komuch expressed the position of the Social Revolutionaries and, to a certain extent, the SVR as a coalition of socialist parties and part of the Cadets. But the VSP could not in any way defend the concept of the cadet “National Center”, since among its ministers (P.V. Vologodsky, Vl.M. Krutovsky, M.B. Shatilov, I.A. Mikhailov, G.B. Patushinsky, I. I. Serebrennikov) there were no cadets at all and at the Meeting the Siberians (I. I. Serebrennikov, V. V. Sapozhnikov, P. P. Ivanov-Rinov) defended their own position.

As is known, back in the spring of 1918, under pressure from the allies, the National Center and the SVR reached an agreement on the general contours of the future Russian government. It was supposed to represent a triumvirate (directory) with the participation of one military man, one cadet and one socialist. Personally, it looked like this: M. V. Alekseev (V. G. Boldyrev), N. I. Astrov (V. A. Vinogradov), N. D. Avksentyevsky (N. V. Tchaikovsky). To maintain the continuity of power, the Constituent Assembly, elected at the end of 1917, had to meet for two or three sessions and, having officially transferred power to the Directory, dissolve itself. After the victory over the Bolsheviks, the Provisional All-Russian Government is obliged to convene a new Assembly on new grounds, “which will speak out about the final government of Russia” (28).

In fact, the Ufa meeting elected not a three-member, but a five-member Directory, increasing its composition at the expense of one Socialist Revolutionary Party and a representative of the VSP. In addition, generals V.G. Boldyrev and M.V. Alekseev swapped places. Finally, the GDP was supposed to “assist in every possible way... in preparing for the resumption of sessions of the Constituent Assembly of the present composition.” Moreover, a procedure was provided for the functioning of the latter from December 1918 or January 1919, with a decrease in the quorum of participants each time. This result caused a negative reaction among the cadet leadership. V.N. Pepelyaev, V.A. Zhardetsky begin preparations for a military coup. Although the Socialist Revolutionaries did not have unanimity regarding the results achieved in Ufa, nevertheless, the Central Committee of the AKP issued a resolution on full support for the Directory, although emphasizing that one should “strive to straighten the line of its behavior” and therefore the party will not renounce “its right to criticize” ( 29). Thus, the results of the Meeting of September 8 - 23, 1918 put into practice the idea of ​​a coalition of socialist parties.

But, in addition to party-political ones, at the Ufa forum intergovernmental differences between Komuch and the VSP were clearly evident, and the latter had its own program. Its contours are outlined in the instructions of the delegation, where the latter was instructed to “do everything possible” to create an all-Russian government “like a Directory consisting of no more than 5 persons”, responsible “only to the future authorized body of the correct expression of the will of the people and until the convening of such a body, the All-Russian government is irreplaceable." Finally, this government “must immediately take into its own hands the matter of creating a unified All-Russian army, unified management of foreign policy, unified management of communications, mail and telegraph, finance on a national scale, leaving the top management of other sectors of state and economic life within Siberia to the relevant bodies Siberian Territorial Autonomous Government" (30). Thus, the Siberians intended to defend the concept of supreme power in the person of a Directory of up to five people, without any dependence on the Constituent Assembly of the previous composition and providing for the convening of a “political body of the correct expression of will” in the foreseeable future. In addition, it was envisaged to maintain the Siberian government with limited powers, i.e. as a federal entity.

In Ufa, the Omsk delegation tried to implement its program and achieved, through the mediation of S.S. Starynkevich, in exchange for agreement on the predominance of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the Directory, the preservation of the VSP as the Council of Ministers of the Provisional All-Russian Authority, but the events in Omsk on September 21 - 22, 1918 put The meeting is on the verge of collapse. In this situation, the Socialist Revolutionaries rejected the claims of the VSP. Her delegation only managed to insist on the inclusion of P.V. Vologodsky (V.V. Sapozhnikov) in the Directory (31). Thus, having conceded to the Siberians in a small way (the quantitative composition of GDP and the inclusion of a representative of the VSP in it), the Socialist Revolutionaries rejected everything else.

The results of the Conference satisfied neither the Cadets nor the Provisional Siberian Government. The struggle of these groups with the Directory began, and the first, in the person of V.N. Pepelyaev, relied on a military coup and the establishment of a regime of a one-man military dictatorship, the second - on the actual subordination of the Directory to their influence by transforming the VSP into the Council of Ministers of an all-Russian scale. Ultimately, the vectors crossed on November 18, 1918 in Omsk.

The course and results of this multifaceted process were influenced by a number of internal and external circumstances: the defeat of the Komuch army and the Czechs (on September 3 the Reds took Syzran, on the 7th - Samara, on the 16th - Bugulma, on November 7 - Izhevsk, essentially depriving the Samara government of territory), the mission of P.V. Vologodsky to the Far East, which led to the elimination of VSP’s competitors represented by the “cabinets” of Derber-Lavrov, General Horvath and promises of help from the allies. These circumstances led to a decline in the authority of the Czechs, who in the fall of 1918 exerted serious pressure on various political groups, giving preference to the Socialist Revolutionaries. The appearance of the interventionists in Omsk and their obvious sympathies for the VSP put the Czechs in their place as obedient puppets of the Allied powers and their representatives in Siberia.

A certain idea of ​​the activities of the Provisional All-Russian Government is given by the minutes of the meetings of the Directory, stored in the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region for the period from September 24 to November 5, 1918 (її 2 - 34) (32). From the memoirs of V. G. Boldyrev it is known that GDP after November 5 was collected on November 7, 8, 12 (33). It is unknown whether there were meetings later. In total, from September 23 to November 18, 1918, there were 37 meetings of the Directory. They passed almost every day. There were rarely breaks for one day (the first one falls on October 7). The first four meetings were attended by N. D. Avksentyev, V. M. Zenzinov, V. V. Sapozhnikov, V. G. Boldyrev. On September 28, V. A. Vinogradov joined them; on October 19, V. V. Sapozhnikov was replaced by P. V. Vologodsky. Attendance was very high. All directors attended regularly. For the first time on November 7, N.D. Avksentievsky, who had left for Tomsk to persuade the Siberian Regional Duma to dissolve itself, did not appear. Instead, V. G. Boldyrev presided, who, in turn, left for the front on November 15.

The intensity of the work and the nature of the issues discussed can be judged by the fact that at 31 recorded meetings, 163 issues were discussed, an average of five per meeting. Three times (October 5, 19, 22) the agendas included one issue each, usually about the formation of a government and its personnel. The meeting on November 4 was the busiest (22 questions). Their duration was not clearly recorded. It is only known that on October 19 the Directory met for 1.5 hours (from 13.20 to 14.50), on October 25 for 2 hours 35 minutes (from 18.25 to 21.00). According to V. G. Boldyrev, the meeting on October 12 lasted until 2 am.

Of the 163 issues discussed, half (84) can be classified as minor. The September 26 agenda is typical in this regard:

1. About the request of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (V.G. Boldyrev - M.Sh.) to release him 25 thousand rubles.
2. On the issuance of 500 rubles to five private assistant professors of Kazan University. for travel expenses due to their appointment as professors at Irkutsk University.
3. On the pardon of 70-year-old M.I. Polyanskaya from Orenburg.
4. Request from the Kustanai archpriest to divide the Orenburg diocese into three parts.
5. About the salaries of refugee teachers.

Regularly (9 times) the directors approved the minutes of previous meetings, listened, took note, thanked for various kinds of greetings, satisfied officials and refugees with allowances and daily allowances, allocating, for example, 2 thousand rubles to Senator N.Z. Shulgin. to buy winter clothes, left behind by the latter in Kazan while fleeing from the Reds. According to the report of P.V. Vologodsky, condolences were telegraphed to Irkutsk to the French diplomat Rainier, who was injured in a car crash. The Directory made a special decision on September 28 based on the report of the manager of the Samara office of the State Bank on the gold reserves of Russia. Since the Red Army was advancing, the gold had to be taken to Chelyabinsk and placed in the basements of the local elevator. The dominance of secondary issues was constantly noted by V. G. Boldyrev: October 13, “in the evening there was a government meeting. The questions are empty." October 17, “infertility again at the evening government meeting.” October 20, “evening session: common infertility” (34).

Often the “small things” reflected the specifics of a chaotic era of social cataclysms like a mirror. Thus, at the aforementioned meeting on September 26, a petition for pardon for 70-year-old Matryona Mikhailovna Polyanskaya from Orenburg, sentenced to death by Ataman Dutov for harboring his son, a Red Army soldier, was discussed. A heated discussion ensued, as V. G. Boldyrev spoke out against the intervention of the GDP in the sphere of legal proceedings , since it will soon be inundated with telegrams of this kind. Objecting to him, V.V. Sapozhnikov noted that the right to pardon is precisely the prerogative of the supreme power. Ultimately, a decision is made to interrogate the commander of the Orenburg Front on the merits of the matter. But on November 4, the petition of the central bureau of trade unions of Tobolsk to abolish the law on the death penalty and to cancel the sentence against participants in the riots in the city on October 18 was left without consequences. Typical of the fall of 1918 was an incident in Krasnoyarsk on October 22, where at a banquet hosted by the head of the local garrison, Colonel Fedorovich, in honor of the officers of the English echelon, after one of the toasts, the orchestra performed the finale from M. Glinka’s opera “A Life for the Tsar”: “Hail “Glory to our Russian Tsar,” and some of the officers demanded the execution of “God Save the Tsar.” The GDP demanded an explanation from Fedorovich.

Ultimately, tired of reacting to all this rigmarole, after the formation of the Council of Ministers, the Directory began to respond to such requests, denunciations, and greetings either to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or to the Ministry of Justice. However, at the beginning of November, she allocated money for the salary of E.F. Rogovsky, staff members, as well as business manager A.N. Kruglikov; on November 5, she took into account the message of P.V. Vologodsky about the celebrations in Vladivostok regarding the restoration imperial double-headed eagle on the monument to Admiral G. N. Nevelsky.

The performance of the Directory was seriously influenced by its members, internal microclimate, and external circumstances. The temporary status of V.V. Sapozhnikov (before the arrival of P.V. Vologodsky) led to his actual inaction and sporadic appearances as an intercessor for receiving benefits. P.V. Vologodsky, who replaced him, also turned out to be a foreign body, since he represented and defended the interests of the VSP. Moreover, his initiation into supreme power began with a small but characteristic incident. None of the members of the Directory met the head of the Provisional Siberian Government who returned from the Far East, since they were simply not notified about it. And then, as V.G. Boldyrev recalls, “Vologodsky promised to come to the government at 2 o’clock, but then he called Avksentyev that he first needed to go to the bathhouse - a clear retribution for our absence at the meeting. The reception is not devoid of purely local flavor” (35).

And within the foursome N.D. Avksentyev, V.M. Zenzinov, V.G. Boldyrev, V.A. Vinogradov there was no unanimity.

“In essence, we were representatives and lawyers of the groups that sent us, deeply contradictory and even hostile in their political and social aspirations, in which it was difficult to form a definite solid majority even in our five,” stated V. G. Boldyrev (36).

The main line of confrontation was between N.D. Avksentiev and V.G. Boldyrev, and then between them and P.V. Vologodsky. The Social Revolutionary circle of the chairman, represented primarily by members of the Constituent Assembly A. N. Kruglikov, A. A. Argunov, E. F. Rogovsky, had a certain impact on the functioning of the body. The first becomes the manager of the affairs of the Directory, is present at all its meetings and, in accordance with the “Procedure for Consideration of Issues” (regulations) approved on September 25, reports on the substance of all issues on the agenda, and also manages the work of the Directory’s apparatus. And although, according to V.G. Boldyrev, “in him the businessman prevailed over the politician” (37), he did not hide his political sympathies. A. A. Argunov, a veteran of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, was the official backup (deputy) of N. D. Avksentyev and he was entrusted with the most important one-time missions - an investigation of the events in Omsk in the last ten days of September, and at the same time an analysis of the situation in the capital of “white” Siberia . E. F. Rogovsky was the de facto head of the VVP security and its counterintelligence. It is characteristic that all three were related to Siberia. A. A. Argunov was born in Yeniseisk, graduated from the Tomsk gymnasium. E. F. Rogovsky and A. N. Kruglikov are elected to the Constituent Assembly, respectively, from the Altai province and the Trans-Baikal region.

The main task of the GDP was, according to the “Act,” until the resumption of the Constituent Assembly’s activities, to exercise the functions of supreme power “in the entire space of the Russian state,” including on the territory of regional state entities (Komuch, VSP, etc.), as well as establishing the limits of the competence of the latter. To implement all this required; firstly, to create a capable management apparatus and... secondly, to resolve the issue of relationships with existing governments.

These problems were first discussed at a meeting of the Directory on September 28 in connection with the issue of her residence. N.D. Avksentyev insisted that the headquarters should under no circumstances be in Siberia, but within European Russia - Samara, Ufa, Yekaterinburg, giving preference to the latter city. He was supported by V. M. Zenzinov. General V. G. Boldyrev defended Ufa, V. V. Sapozhnikov “definitely spoke in favor of moving the capital to Omsk, where the government could most conveniently locate and work calmly.” Ultimately, N.D. Avksentyev’s proposal is accepted (l. 13). It is duplicated on October 1 (fol. 25). On September 28, according to the report of A. N. Kruglikov, a decision was made to form the apparatus of the GDP from local forces, “without calling from Omsk and Samara” (l. 16), but the next day N. D. Avksentyev proposed to correct the wording “without calling it entirely from Samara or Omsk” (l. 19).

On September 28, N.D. Avksentyev first formulated a proposal on the design of government bodies, which boils down to the fact that members of the Directory, as bearers of sovereign power, should not have separate portfolios, i.e. head ministries. For this purpose, “a business Council of Ministers should be created, namely the Council, and not a solidary cabinet in the parliamentary sense, i.e. ministers must be appointed by the Provisional Government” (l. 18). The proposal is accepted. On September 29, the Directory came to the conclusion that it was necessary to delineate powers with regional (regional) governments, and on September 30, the first appointments were made. V.V. Sapozhnikov is entrusted with organizing the Ministry of Public Education, and the former comrade of Minister Komuch, Socialist Revolutionary A.I. Bashkirov, is offered the post of Minister of Food and Supply. At the same time, “Komuch’s department of foreign affairs is ordered to prepare, together with all its technical apparatus, to move to the place of residence of the Provisional All-Russian Government, without prejudging the issue of the further use of each member of the staff of this department” (ll. 23–24). On October 1, the former head of the “Council of Administrative Departments” Komuch E.F. Rogovsky was appointed head of the main department for police affairs and public order with the rights of the manager of the ministry (l. 25). As we can see, the first appointments were in favor of Komuch, especially since E. F. Rogovsky was entrusted with organizing counterintelligence and managing law enforcement agencies.

The situation changed in a certain way on October 3, when Comrade Minister of Finance VSP, summoned earlier to Ufa. N. D. Buyanovsky, “a banking figure / since 1910 director of the Omsk branch of the Russian-Asian Bank - M.Sh. / with vaguely socialist sympathies” (38), is appointed associate minister of finance of the GDP and is entrusted with its organization and temporary management . Then the Directory makes a decision:

“In view of the urgent need for the government apparatus for immediate management work and the need to establish close connections with the East, choose the city of Omsk as a temporary residence, in order to transfer the residence to European Russia in the near future” (l. 28).

It canceled the two previous ones: September 28 and October 1. Discussions about the “urgent need for a government apparatus” and “the need to establish close ties with the East” should not be misleading. The true reason is revealed in the decree of October 4 on the evacuation of Samara. Under the pressure of the Red Army, which took the capital of Komuch three days later, the supreme all-Russian government left Ufa for Chelyabinsk on the day this decision was made. True, on the eve of departure, another group of Komuchevites was appointed - E. E. Grevs became a member of the council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the manager of the State Control Affairs G. A. Krasnov was nominated, the same posts in the ministries of justice, post and telegraphs were given to S. S. Starynkevich and E. A. Tseslinsky (l.32).

On October 5, when the train with members of the Directory arrived in Chelyabinsk, they approved the regulations on the establishment of ministries, on the chief commissioners and on the relationship between the central and regional administrations. Its essence boiled down to the formation of the following ministries under the GDP: military, foreign affairs, finance, justice, communications, posts and telegraphs, state. control, uniting in them the relevant structures of regional governments. In addition, the functioning of the latter ministries was allowed: internal affairs, supply and food, trade and industry, labor, agriculture, public education. At the same time, they were created under the Directory. In addition, in the autonomous regions and under Komuch, the institution of chief representatives of the GDP was established, who were attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and monitored that local actions and decisions did not contradict the legislation and orders of the supreme power. Thus, a two-level system of executive bodies was established - federal (national) and federal-regional.

On the way to Omsk, members of the Directory met twice more: on October 6 and 8, discussing a number of minor issues. The report of the manager of affairs on the 8th on the friction between the VSP and the Bashkir government is worthy of mention, on which the following decision was made: “Recognizing the rights of the Bashkir and other small peoples inhabiting Russia to national-cultural self-determination, the question of territorial autonomy is left open until it is considered in the appropriate bodies of the central All-Russian administration and until the Provisional All-Russian Government issues appropriate legislative acts on this issue” (l. 40). On October 2, a similar resolution was adopted in relation to Alash-Orda (l.26).

On the morning of October 9, a train with members of the Directory arrived in Omsk, where a ceremonial meeting with a guard of honor, a parade, speeches, etc. took place. “Everything was going wonderfully. The official side is impeccable,” this is how V. G. Boldyrev summed up his impressions (39). This refutes the statement of G. Z. Ioffe, with reference to an anonymous eyewitness, about the cool attitude towards the supreme power at the meeting in the Siberian capital (40).

Now, at least briefly, we should touch upon the state of affairs in Omsk at the time the directors appeared here. By the end of October 1918, there were two plenipotentiary ministers of the Provisional Siberian Government - I. A. Mikhailov and I. I. Serebrennikov. The latter, as deputy chairman, acted as head of the cabinet. Its official head was completing his mission in the Far East. Minister of Justice G. B. Patushinsky, by telegram from Irkutsk dated September 27, notified of his resignation. Despite the decision of the Directory on September 24 to consider the resignation of Vl.M. Krutovsky and M.B. Shatilov invalid and even their arrival in Omsk on October 1, P.V. Vologodsky telegraphically demanded that they and I.A. Mikhailov “temporarily unofficially withdraw from now on before my arrival and the final investigation” (41). Vl.M. Krutovsky and M.B. Shatilov “removed”, now completely, I.A. Mikhailov continued to remain in his post. In reality, all matters of public administration were in charge of the Administrative Council, as a board of governing ministries and departments.

There is a strong historiographical tradition linking the preparation for the overthrow of the Directory and the establishment of the one-man military dictatorship of Admiral A.V. Kolchak with the actions of V.N. Pepelyaev and I.A. Mikhailov, taken after the arrival of the GDP in Omsk. The facts we have allow us to assert that preparations for this action began much earlier and were associated with General A. N. Grishin-Almazov and I. A. Mikhailov. It was prevented due to the unexpected resignation of the head of the War Ministry on September 5, 1918. In the manuscript of memoirs “The Siberian Movement and Communism” by such a competent eyewitness as M. P. Golovachev, who headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time in question, the following is reported on this matter:

“If you think about the meaning of the coup on November 18, then, of course, it cannot be called a coup carried out by Adm. Kolchak. This was a coup in favor of the Mikhailovsky group, planned long before this day. The only change from the original plan was the appearance of Verkh in the role. The ruler was not General Grishin-Almazov, but Adm. Kolchak, and thanks to this circumstance, it was not I. A. Mikhailov, but P. V. Vologodsky who became the Prime Minister of the Russian Government” (42).

Therefore, it seems unlikely that the creator of the Siberian Army, authoritative in various social circles from the extreme right to the Socialist Revolutionaries, with whom he actively collaborated underground, was dismissed for diplomatic indiscretion towards the English consul (43). Moreover, the left wing of the VSP, represented by M. B. Shatilov, G. B. Patushinsky, insisted on resignation, while the right wing (I. A. Mikhailov, I. I. Serebrennikov) defended the general. His dismissal caused protest on their part and resignations, which were supported by similar actions by all members of the Administrative Council (44). Apparently, there is quite reliable information about the upcoming A. N. Grishin-Almazov's coup forced the left side of the VSP to achieve his resignation under the first pretext that came up.

But I. A. Mikhailov remained, about whom his cabinet colleague Vl. M. Krutovsky said the following in September 1918: “He was under the influence of the commercial and industrial class and the military. I’m not talking about everyone, but military groups hostile to the Duma and the Siberian Government in general, such as the group of officers that arrested us. During their conversation about the general situation, I was surprised by their hatred, not from the point of view that the Government is bad, but from the centralist point of view, that the Siberian Government should not exist, that the salvation of Russia only lies in firm power and that all individual governments must be destroyed and that blood cannot be spared for this” (45).

The position of the VSP on the eve of negotiations with the Directory was formulated by I. A. Mikhailov and approved by P. V. Vologodsky and on October 5 sent by telegraph to the location of the VSP. Its main provisions were as follows: “1. The Siberian Directory, in view of the exit of Vologodsky, Krutovsky, Shatilov and Patushinsky, which is actually unable to carry out its current functions, is abolished. 2. The Administrative Council is transformed into the Cabinet of Ministers. 3. Resumption of Sib classes. region Duma and its commissions are not allowed” (47).

Arriving in Omsk, the Directory found itself in a peculiar position. Characterizing it, L. A. Krol noted: “Here, completely openly and freely, as if about something normal, they asked questions: did the Directory do a smart thing by transferring the gold reserve to the territory of the Siberian government, because the latter can now completely adapt the reserve and throw away the directory . Isn’t the Directory using the Czech garrison subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Boldyrev, which, as is known, proposes to arrest the Siberian government on the first order of the Directory, which he can do quite calmly, because the Russian garrison is too weak to even attempt resistance” (48).

Numerous delegations from various kinds of public associations (the Union for the Revival of Russia, cooperators, people's socialists, Mensheviks, cadets, etc.) visited the directors and demanded in their declarations: firstly, to preserve the GSP; secondly, to liquidate the regional Duma, “as an institution expressing party views and sentiments only of certain groups, and not of the entire population of vast Siberia” (49). A. A. Argunov, who was here with emergency powers, admitted: “The directorate did not have support in Omsk even in left-wing circles, and there is nothing to say about the right” (50).

In such a situation, the GDP could not, with the help of the Czechs, force the Provisional Siberian Government to obey. At least three memoirists (L. A. Krol, I. M. Maisky, G. E. Katanaev) considered this possibility likely and noted the readiness of the Czechs to help the Directory clear the “Omsk swamp” (51). However, N.D. Avksentyev did not dare to use this force. “I don’t want to have my own “Latvians,” he said, according to L.A. Krol, “hinting at Lenin” (52).

At the first meeting in Omsk on October 10, V. A. Vinogradov reported on the decisions taken by the Administrative Council: “a). no reconstruction of the Siberian administrative apparatus will be carried out until the arrival of P.V. Vologodsky; b). place it as a whole at the disposal of the Provisional All-Russian Government; V). if the Provisional All-Russian Government wishes to make changes in the personnel of the highest administration of the Siberian government, accept them by mutual agreement between the All-Russian Government and the Administrative Council” (l. 46). In turn, A. A. Argunov brought to the attention of the directors the position of the VSP of October 5, already known to us, stated to him by I. I. Serebrennikov. A heated exchange of views took place, as a result of which the following resolution was adopted: “a). point out to the Administrative Council the inviolability and indisputability of the provisions of the law on the relationship between the Central Government and the Regional Governments, in particular the provisions that speak of the removal from the competence of the Regional Governments of the functions of public administration listed in the law; b). indicate the Government’s intention to use the apparatus of central departments now; V). confirm the appointment of Ministers made; G). pending the precise resolution of the competencies of the Central and Regional authorities in the practical implementation of these decisions, it is possible to recognize the opinions of the Administrative Council as possible” (l. 47).

On October 11, N.D. Avksentyev met with I.I. Serebrennikov. They agreed to hold a private meeting of the Directory and the Administrative Council on October 12 to discuss the current situation. Having discussed the information of its leader, the GDP at the evening meeting recognizes as a mandatory condition of the agreement with the Siberians “the transfer to the jurisdiction of the All-Russian Government of those seven Ministries (military, foreign affairs, finance, police, railways, posts and telegraphs, state control - M.Sh.) , which are listed in the resolution of October 5” (l. 47). But at the same meeting, the Directory decided to maintain “for the near future, on the territory of Komuch, the Council of Administrative Agencies” (ibid.). At the same time, B.V. Savinkov “surfaced” to the directors, who, after the riots he had prepared in Yaroslavl and Rybinsk, was hiding in Kazan, and for some time was in V.O. Kappel’s detachment. The former Socialist Revolutionary and assistant to A.F. Kerensky was planned by Omsk “public circles” for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the All-Russian government. They got rid of the persistent applicant by entrusting him with a mission to Western Europe, “in order to find out the true intentions of the governments of the allied powers” ​​(l. 48). Usually stingy in expenses for representation, the Directory allocated a significant amount to Savinkov on October 13.

On October 12, the private meeting ended with the following agreement: “1. all regional governments, not excluding the Siberian one, are “temporarily” abolished, and the Siberian Regional Duma is dissolved; 2). before the arrival of P.V. Vologodsky, the Directory uses the business apparatus of the Administrative Council as it is; 3). The Directory forms the first composition of the Council of Ministers by agreement between it and the Siberian government; 4). the chairman of the Council of Ministers is appointed by the Directory from among its members, at the moment Vologda is appointed chairman; 5). The Directory declares the circumstance - to provide Siberia with a regional representative body; 6). legislative acts of the Siberian government remain in force and can be amended and repealed by the Directory in the general legislative manner; 7). The directory, with the unity of the Russian army, retains the territorial method of recruiting it and, in addition to the mandatory ones, regional territorial colors (white and green for Siberians)” (53).

On October 13, in pursuance of the second point of the agreement, the Directory decided: “Prior to the formation of the central ministries by the Provisional All-Russian Government: military, foreign affairs, finance, justice, railways, posts and telegraphs and state control, temporary management of urgent affairs of these central ministries shall be entrusted under the direct supervision of the Provisional All-Russian Government to the relevant ministries of the Provisional Siberian Government” (l. 49) (54). In order to make it clear to everyone that the phrase “under the direct leadership of the Provisional All-Russian Government” is not an empty phrase, the latter, at the same meeting, distributed the functions of general leadership among its members, although on September 29 they agreed not to have portfolios as a collective bearer of power. N. D. Avksentyev was entrusted with overseeing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, V. G. Boldyrev - the military and the Ministry of Railways, V. A. Vinogradov - trade and industry, finance, state control, food and supplies, justice; V. M. Zenzinov - post and telegraphs, agriculture, labor; V.V. Sapozhnikov - public education (l.50). Since control over the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice was transferred temporarily to N.D. Avksentyev and V.A. Vinogradov, it can be assumed that they were supposed to be transferred to permanent management by P.V. Vologodsky.

He arrived in Omsk on October 18. After the collapse of the “white” movement, many “formers” in emigration wrote about Vologodsky, not without annoyance, as a person of the “Tolstoy” type, prone to moralizing. Here are two pieces of evidence relating to the time of the events being analyzed. V. G. Boldyrev, seeing the head of the Siberian government for the first time, wrote: “Quite unprepossessing in appearance, not bright in content. Just sir” (55). Vl.M. Krutovsky testified: “Vologodsky’s group was not under anyone’s influence. Vologodsky was an extremely gentle person, extremely correct in character, but not a person who would go against his convictions and submit to outside influence” (56).

At the same time, this “Siberian Lvov”(57) demonstrated in 1918–1919. an example of exceptional political resourcefulness, he managed to come to an agreement with the interventionists, join the Directory and maintain his position under A.V. Kolchak, resigning as one of the last in November 1919. So at a meeting on October 19, he informed the members of the Directory about the successful completion of the mission to Far East, the liquidation of the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia and the “business” cabinet of General D. L. Horvath. In passing, with reference to the famous whistleblower of provocateurs V.L. Burtsev, he reported on P.Ya. Derber’s service in the secret police until 1917. True, he failed to achieve diplomatic recognition from the allies, but neither the Directory nor the “supreme ruler” managed to do this. But military and financial assistance was promised, “the allies insist that there can be no peace at the expense of Russia, that Russia must be restored as a great power, that Germany must learn a lesson for its crime” (l. 61).

While P.V. Vologodsky was reporting on his mission, participants in the congress of members of the Constituent Assembly arrived in Yekaterinburg, greeted with hostility by the local military command. And on October 18, according to the report of A. N. Kruglikov, the Directory decides to place in Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, Petropavlovsk “officials of the Komuch department evacuated from Samara” (l. 57). These circumstances did not at all contribute to strengthening the authority of the GDP before the decisive round of negotiations with the GSP regarding the organization of the Council of Ministers.

On October 22, at the next meeting, P.V. Vologodsky and I.A. Mikhailov formulated proposals on behalf of the VSP regarding the organization of power. In general, they repeated the conditions put forward at a private meeting on October 12, specifying point 3 in the sense that “the formation of the All-Russian Council of Ministers should be entrusted to P.V. Vologodsky, and the Provisional All-Russian Government has the right to challenge candidates” (l. 69). In addition, I. A. Mikhailov puts forward the position that “the All-Russian Council of Ministers should be a business-like, and not a cabinet of solidarity in the parliamentary sense of the word” (ibid.). It did not meet with objections, since the Directory came to a similar conclusion on September 28 (l. 18). What was fundamentally new at the meeting on October 22 was the recognition by the supreme power of the right of P.V. Vologodsky to nominate candidates for the cabinet of ministers. Therefore, the issue of the personal composition of the future Council of Ministers was not discussed, although N.D. Avksentyev announced the Directory’s proposals on this matter.

The next day (October 23), P.V. Vologodsky said he was not ready to announce proposals on the composition of the Council of Ministers. But I. I. Serebrennikov, who was present at the meeting, formulated the following proposals of the VSP on the structure of the body: 1). The GSP Ministry of Native Affairs must be abolished; 2). the main police, post and telegraph departments should be transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 3). The Ministry of Supply and Food is divided into two; 4). the ministry of confessions created at the proposal of the GDP should essentially be the ministry of the Orthodox confession (by analogy with the Synod - M.Sh.), and the affairs of other confessions should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (ll. 77–78). N.D. Avksentyev tries to object in the sense that the proposed reshuffles significantly overload the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but, ultimately, the proposals of the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council are taken into account.

A discussion arose on the issue of the procedure for dissolving the Siberian Regional Duma. The Directory agreed in principle with the proposal of the Supreme Soviet, but considered it necessary to gather it for one or two meetings for self-dissolution. P.V. Vologodsky and I.I. Serebrennikov objected. N.D. Avksentyev “points out that the Provisional All-Russian Government will be in a false position if it dissolves the Duma, i.e. will take the step that the Siberian Government did not dare to take” (l.76). Ultimately, at the proposal of V. A. Vinogradov, by three votes to two (Vologodsky, Boldyrev), a decision was made to convene the Duma for one day for self-dissolution. It is supplemented by a clause to notify the Supreme Court about this “for its judgment on this issue” (l. 77). This circumstance allowed V.G. Boldyrev to write down: “Mexico among snow and frost” (58).

After the 23rd, the Directory met to discuss minor issues on October 25th, after which there was a break until the 30th. In the interval, private meetings of directors with members of the Supreme Council were held in order to agree on proposals on the composition of the Council of Ministers. According to V.G. Boldyrev, they took place on October 25, 27, 28, 29. At the same time, the Siberians threw aside diplomatic etiquette and spoke in a categorical tone. “This is not Bashkurdistan!” said the head of the Ministry of Agriculture and Colonization, Professor N.I. Petrov, and hit the table with his fist (59). Fierce disputes split the Directory. According to the bulletin of the Omsk department of the Union of Revival of Russia, “in the negotiations... the position of the Siberian Government and the bloc had rather weak protection, because if General Boldyrev showed the necessary firmness in defending our interests, then P.V. Vologodsky was not distinguished by such firmness, and Coun. Vinogradov, despite the fact that he was a member of the Central Committee of the Kade party, always leaned towards Avksentyev and Zenzinov” (60).

The discussion also unfolded on individual candidates for the Council of Ministers. The Siberians defended A.V. Kolchak as Minister of War and Navy, B.V. Savinkov - foreign affairs, I.A. Mikhailov - internal affairs, L.A. Ustrugov - communications, G.K. Gins - labor, Fedoseev - finance, Ermakova - justice. In turn, N.D. Avksentyev and V.M. Zenzinov insisted on the creation of a Ministry of Police headed by E.F. Rogovsky (61). Already on October 25, it was possible to resolve the issue of B.V. Savinkov, who was sent on a diplomatic mission to Western Europe. Instead, Yu. V. Klyuchnikov, a private associate professor at Moscow University and adviser to the Russian embassy in Beijing, is recommended for the diplomatic department. It was relatively easy to agree to retain for L.I. Shumilovsky and G.K. Gins the posts they held, respectively the Minister of Labor and the Administrator of the Council of Ministers. The candidacy of S. S. Starynkevich is being approved for the post of Minister of Justice.

During the discussion, we talked about A.V. Kolchak. Since no one knew the admiral in Omsk, S.V. Vostrotin, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, undertook to characterize him. As L.A. Krol testifies: “According to Vostrotin, Admiral Kolchak was far from the same as before. He became a person who changes decisions too often and hesitates. Very nervous... All the time, I saw the admiral and found that it would not be harmful to give him another three months leave... Definitely indicated that at the moment this candidacy is not very suitable” (62). But that is precisely why, apparently, the candidacy of A.V. Kolchak satisfied the opposing factions, who hoped to win over the admiral to themselves.

The candidacy of I. A. Mikhailov caused strong objections from the majority of members of the Directory. In turn, representatives of the Provisional Siberian Government spoke out against E.F. Rogovsky. Almost the entire subsequent discussion revolved around these individuals. On October 27, in response to the statement of P.V. Vologodsky, “that the question of Mikhailov’s candidacy for the post of Minister of Internal Affairs under pressure from the local “public” is considered unconditional,” N.D. Avksentyev, V.M. Zenzinov, V.A. Vinogradov reported withdrawal from GDP. “The embarrassed Vologodsky stated that apparently there was only one thing left for him to do - to abandon the mission of constituting the Council of Ministers” (63). There was no progress on October 28. “Avksentyev became completely nervous, Vologodsky also gave in outwardly,” V. G. Boldyrev wrote in his diary (64). On the 29th the situation repeated itself regarding the appointment of E.F. Rogovsky. Despite the agreement of the members of the Directory to lower his status with the post of Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs, P.V. Vologodsky strongly objected to his appearance in the Council of Ministers in any capacity (65).

Meanwhile, the political atmosphere in Omsk was thickening. Like a magnet, officers were drawn here from all sides, filling the headquarters of the Siberian Army and numerous Cossack “partisan detachments” (Krasilnikova, Annenkova, etc.). In restaurants, clubs and cafes they staged drunken orgies, singing “God Save the Tsar” at the top of their lungs (66). A clear indication of their capabilities and a kind of warning to the Directory was the brutal murder of a member of the Constituent Assembly on October 24. Secretary of the Ufa State Conference, Socialist Revolutionary B. N. Moiseenko, who arrived in Omsk with the detachment of E. F. Rogovsky.

“In public and military circles the idea of ​​dictatorship is becoming stronger and stronger,” testifies V. G. Boldyrev (67). Certain hints on this matter were made to the general himself. Of the military men in eastern Russia, he was perhaps the most authoritative both in terms of combat experience and political orientation. Against this background, A.V. Kolchak’s candidacy looked pale. But the Supreme Commander-in-Chief compromised himself in the eyes of the right with his participation in the Directory and his arrogant and skeptical attitude towards the order in Omsk, in particular in the military environment. In addition, he was weakly connected with the “field commanders”, the leaders of formations and associations at the front, since he had not traveled there since September and was engaged in political activities. Therefore, already on October 28, the general writes in his diary that the idea of ​​dictatorship “will probably be associated with Kolchak.” On October 30, the assumption was confirmed by V. A. Vinogradov, who informed Boldyrev that military circles and local cadets led by V. A. Zhardetsky “tipped Kolchak to be a dictator” (68).

On October 30, the Directory discussed the situation at the negotiations. True, before this she actually had to bow to the Supreme Soviet, since the Council of Managing Agencies of Komuch made a tearful request for financial assistance. V. A. Vinogradov and I. A. Mikhailov are entrusted with finding the necessary funds (l. 86). Then a fierce dispute began again about the candidacies of I. A. Mikhailov and E. F. Rogovsky. The latter was rejected by the Siberians due to professional unsuitability. The argument is more than strange, since for this reason it was possible to express distrust in almost the entire composition of the Supreme Council and the Directory. At least E.F. Rogovsky had solid experience in practical activities, for in 1917 under A.F. Kerensky he was the mayor of Petrograd, and in 1918 he headed the Council of Administrative Departments of Komuch. Ultimately, the GDP recognized “it is absolutely necessary to introduce E. F. Rogovsky into the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a comrade minister, head of the police.” As for I. A. Mikhailov, here he made a concession. Considering that “at this time, given the current political situation, the inclusion of Mikhailov in the Council of Ministers would be inappropriate and politically harmful.” But, the Directory decided the question of the latter’s position “does not consider it necessary to issue an ultimatum and only express in this sense the wish that the opinion of the Provisional All-Russian Government be taken into account both by the Provisional Siberian Government and by I. A. Mikhailov himself” (l. 89) .

On October 31, at the next meeting of the Directory, the issue of supposed power in the Urals in connection with the upcoming liquidation of the regional government here was discussed, seemingly far from the problem of forming the Council of Ministers. The people of the Urals, represented by L.A. Krol, sought the consent in principle of the GDP to the creation of a regional representative body and, in accordance with the decree of the supreme power of October 5, the appointment of the chief commissioner for the Urals. P.V. Vologodsky categorically objected, “since this issue has not yet been resolved in relation to Siberia” (l. 94), although the Directory recognized the right of Siberia to create a representative body on October 22. Ultimately, a resolution is adopted: “The Provisional All-Russian Government, based on the unique economic features of the mining and processing Urals, considers it necessary to introduce elements into the organization of management of the Urals that correspond to these features and fundamentally recognizes the possibility of creating an All-Ural Representative Body that unites the work of local self-government” (l. 97).

The final agreement on the candidacies of I. A. Mikhailov and E. F. Rogovsky was reached at a private meeting on November 1. The GDP is forced to agree to include the former in the cabinet, although without specifying his position yet. In turn, the Supreme Soviet agreed to the appointment of E.F. Rogovsky as a fellow Minister of Internal Affairs. The Czechs put some pressure on the disputants. According to the information bulletin of the Omsk department of the SVR, representatives of the latter, “appearing to Vologodsky, stated that if Rogovsky was not accepted to the post of Minister of Police, then Avksentyev and Zenzinov would leave the Directory, and in this case the Czechoslovaks would leave the front” (69).

Taking into account the agreement reached, at a meeting on November 2, the Directory decides to abolish the Urval regional government and the Council of Administrative Departments of Komuch, gives sanction to the formation of a commission to develop regulations on the Siberian representative body, approves the letter of the GDP to all regional governments and to all citizens of the Russian state. regarding the liquidation of regional governments and the establishment of the All-Russian Council of Ministers. In addition, decrees on the appointment of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and managing departments were discussed, but consensus on a number of candidates was not reached and then it was decided to edit the projects” (l. 102).

Nevertheless, considering the issue finally resolved, on November 3, the VSP, represented by P.V. Vologodsky, I.I. Serebrennikov, I.A. Mikhailov and the business manager G.K. Gins, signed the declaration “On the transfer of supreme power in the territory of Siberia to the Provisional To the All-Russian Government" (70).

On November 4, at a meeting of the Directory, the final details of the resolution are agreed upon. It is then that the composition of the Council of Ministers is finally “settled”. From the telegram of the assistant manager of the GDP Butov to Tomsk A.V. Adrianov dated November 5, it can be understood that on the 4th the appointment of comrades as Minister of Trade and Industry N.N. Shchukin, Internal Affairs A.N. Gattenberg and Minister of Finance I.A. Mikhalova (71). The Directory approved a decree on the abolition of the Administrative Council of the Supreme Soviet, a decree on the composition of the Council of Ministers and a decree on the All-Russian Council of Ministers (ll. 112–116). On the same day, the directors solemnly opened the first meeting of the All-Russian Council of Ministers (72).

His personal composition looked like this:

• Chairman of the Council of Ministers P. V. Vologodsky, Deputy Chairman V. A. Vinogradov,
• Minister of War and Marine A.V. Kolchak;
• correcting the post of Comrade Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the temporary management of the ministry of Yu. V. Klyuchnikov entrusted to him; Comrade Minister of Foreign Affairs V. E. Grevs, correcting the post of Comrade Minister of Foreign Affairs V. G. Zhukovsky;
• manager of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A. N. Guttenberger; comrades of the Minister of Internal Affairs A. A. Gratsianov, N. Ya. Novombergsky, P. F. Karopchinsky, E. F. Rogovsky, with the appointment of the latter as head of the police department;
• Minister of Supply I. I. Serebrennikov; Comrade Minister I. A. Molodykh;
• Minister of Finance I. A. Mikhailov; Comrade Minister N.D. Buyanovsky;
• Minister of Food N. S. Zefirov; comrades of the minister I. G. Znamensky and N. V. Dmitriev;
• Minister of Justice S.S. Starynkevich; Comrade Minister A.P. Morozov;
• Minister of Railways L. A. Ustrugov; Comrade Ministers G. M. Stepanenko and A. M. Larionov;
• Minister of Education V.V. Sapozhnikov; Comrade Minister G.K. Gins;
• Minister of Agriculture N.I. Petrov; fellow ministers N.P. Oganovsky, A.M. Yarmosh, V.A. Baryshevtsev;
• Minister of Labor L.I. Shumilovsky; Comrade Minister S. M. Tretyak;
• Comrade of the Minister of Trade and Industry N.N. Shchukin, with the entrustment of management of the ministry to him;
• State Comptroller G. A. Krasnov;
• Head of the Main Directorate of Posts and Telegraphs E. A. Tseslinsky; his assistant V. M. Mironov;
• Managing Director of the Council of Ministers G. G. Telberg (73).

We do not have information on all members of the cabinet, but the available material allows us to draw some conclusions. First of all, the Supreme Soviet managed to impose its structure as the highest executive body. The Ministry of Native Affairs is liquidated, and its de facto leader N. Ya. Novombergsky becomes comrade of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Confessions was never created, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs turned into a kind of monster, judging by the number of minister’s comrades, concentrating local government, counterintelligence, police, religious and national issues in its hands.

The All-Russian Council of Ministers included all members of the Provisional Siberian Government, including almost the entire Administrative Council, with the exception of M.P. Golovachev and P.P. Gudkov. Having approved the composition of the cabinet, the Directory was forced to thereby cancel its own resolution of September 24 and sanction the de facto resignation of M. B. Shatilov, Vl. M. Krutovsky and G. B. Patushinsky. Thus, the core of the new government was made up of members of the GSP. To them it is necessary to add persons who arrived together with P.V. Vologodsky from the Far East: Yu.V. Klyuchnikov, L.A. Ustrugov and others. Finally. The Council of Ministers includes a number of Siberians who are not members of the VSP: A. N. Gattenberger, S. M. Tretyak, V. V. Baryshevtsev and others, and Siberians made up a solid majority in the cabinet.

From the point of view of party affiliation and political orientation, there were few people with clearly expressed views in it - Cadets V. A. Vinogradov, V. V. Baryshevtsev, G. G. Telberg; Socialist Revolutionaries E. F. Rogovsky, P. K. Karopchinsky, N. P. Oganovsky; Menshevik L.I. Shumilovsky. Some of the rest once joined various parties - I. A. Molodykh (social democrat in 1906), N. S. Zefirov (people's socialist in 1917), S. S. Starynkevich (socialist revolutionist in 1907). ), I. I. Serebrennikov (Social Democrat in 1905, Socialist Revolutionary in 1917), G. K. Gins (cadet in April 1917), but by the end of 1917 they considered themselves non-party. Many of them include the characteristics of G. K. Ginsu, given by the Sibirsky Vestnik - “political sympathies ... belongs to moderate movements, does not like party activities”, N. S. Zefirov - “never took part in purely political life” , or I.I. Serebrennikov - “is a non-partisan person and a deep patriot” (74).

It is very symptomatic that a number of ministers before 1917, in 1917–1918. took an active part in the activities of the regionalists (A. N. Gattenberger, I. I. Serebrennikov, G. K. Gins, N. D. Buyanovsky, N. Ya. Novombergsky, I. A. Molodykh, P. V. Vologodsky). The share of professors (N. Ya. Novombergsky, V. V. Sapozhnikov, G. K. Gins, N. I. Petrov, G. G. Telberg, I. A. Mikhailov) and private assistant professors (Yu. V. Klyuchnikov, N.P. Oganovsky), i.e. every fourth. Lawyers were represented in the government in the same proportion (N. Ya. Novombergsky, G. K. Gins, G. G. Telberg, P. V. Vologodsky, V. A. Vinogradov, S. S. Starynkevich, A. A. Gratsianov, A. P. Morozov, A. N. Gattenberger). We can agree with the conclusion of L. A. Krol that “under the guise of the Directory, the actual executive power ended up in the hands of our old friends, the Siberian ministers. The advantage was that the sign was not Siberian, but All-Russian” (75).

Assessing the results of what happened, V.N. Pepelyaev, who arrived in Omsk at the time in question, stated: “If Sib. Govt. did not recognize the Directory and itself became the All-Russian Government - even this would have been approved. Sib. Govt. chose a slightly different path. They took the place of the All-Russian Council of M-rov. We believe that this greatly weakened Uf's error. Meetings. We are ready to say that the Council of Ministers deserves support, but we need to first find out its point of view on a number of issues, like the Region. Duma"(76). But this problem was overcome and on November 10 the Siberian Regional Duma dissolved itself (77).

It seemed that the members of the Directory should triumph. They achieved the elimination of regional governments and created a functional Council of Ministers. This is exactly how V. G. Boldyrev assessed what happened: “It was a major victory, achieved solely by the authority of the Government, and great moral satisfaction” (78). Out of inertia, the GDP tried, as it seemed to its members, to deal with state affairs. But in essence, they turned out to be removed from them and turned into a decorative body, which through its actions objectively strengthened the position of the Council of Ministers.

The meeting of the Directory on November 5 is indicative in this regard. It turned out that G. K. Gins never prepared a draft resolution on the formation of a commission to develop regulations on elections to the Siberian representative body and thereby did not comply with the decision of the GDP of November 2. Further, the Directory had to swallow a bitter pill in the form of a telegram from the Ural Trade and Industrial Union, rejecting the need to create a representative body in the Urals “in the interests of the unity and independence of Russia” and calling for “destroying regional tendencies in the Urals and subordinating all military and civil administration to one person”( l.121). Taken together, both facts indicated a loss of interest among right-wing Cadet circles in popular representation and their reliance on a one-man dictatorship.

Next, the Directory had to put in place the Council of Administrative Departments of Komuch, which telegraphically insisted on the need to continue its activities “until the military situation improves.” The following decision is made: “In view of the abolition of all Regional Governments, the decision of the Council of Authorized Agencies is recognized as unacceptable” (l. 122). Finally, in a new capacity, P.V. Vologodsky reported on behalf of the Council of Ministers on matters requiring the permission of directors. First of all, he reported on the death sentence pronounced in Krasnoyarsk by a Czechoslovak military court against a Russian citizen. Thus, the directors were asked to deal with their allies themselves. The second question concerned the already mentioned case with the restoration of the double-headed eagle on the monument to Admiral G.N. Nevelsky (taken into account) (l. 123). Thus, the All-Russian Council of Ministers was not going to share power with the Directory, in fact introducing an information blockade regime in relation to it.

On November 7, the Provisional All-Russian Government met in full force for the last time. On the 8th, N.D. Avksentyev and A.A. Argunov went to Tomsk to persuade the Siberian Regional Duma to dissolve itself. After their return, on November 15, V. G. Boldyrev went to the front, and the events of November 18 found him in Ufa. Meanwhile, right-wing bourgeois circles are heading towards establishing a military dictatorship. Since this process was analyzed in the works of G.Z. Ioffe, V.V. Garmiza, N.G. Dumova, we will only point out some details.

First of all, the interventionists, who had the opportunity after the surrender of Germany to strengthen their influence on the anti-Bolshevik groups, relied on a military dictatorship. English and French military contingents appear in Omsk. This circumstance led to a decline in the influence of the Czechs on Siberian affairs, who were relegated to the background. The practical preparations for the coup were led, judging by A.D. Syromyatnikov’s letter to I.A. Mikhailov dated April 14, 1919, by I.A. Mikhailov, V.N. Pepelyaev and Siberian Army headquarters officer Colonel A.D. Syromyatnikov (79). In particular, they persuaded the head of the garrison, Colonel V.I. Volkov, to arrest the Socialist Revolutionary members of the Directory. The latter agreed, setting four conditions: “1). assurances from prominent political figures of the sympathy of public groups for the upcoming coup; 2). participation in the coup of its organizers; 3). a guarantee for the allies that they will not take countermeasures in the event of a coup; 4). promotion of Volkov to general" (80). Such guarantees were given by V.N. Pepelyaev and I.A. Mikhailov. However, preparations went so quickly that not everything could be taken into account. When on November 18, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the issue of the form of government was discussed and they settled on A.V. Kolchak. as a candidate for the post of “supreme ruler”, it turned out that none of the ministers knew the admiral closely and there was no one to give him a detailed description (81).

On the night of November 18, a combined detachment of military foremen I.N. Krasilnikov and A.V. Katanaev, on the orders of V.I. Volkov, arrested N.D. Avksentyev, V.M. Zenzinov, E.F. Rogovsky at the latter’s apartment, A. A. Argunov at the Rossiya Hotel. The blow is dealt to the Socialist-Revolutionary part of the Directory, since V. A. Vinogradov and P. V. Vologodsky were not arrested. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on November 18, V. A. Vinogradov announced his resignation from the Directory and then a decision was made to transfer supreme power to A. V. Kolchak. “If he (the Council of Ministers - M.Sh.), asserts I. I. Serebrennikov, had made some other decision, he would have been immediately dispersed by the forces that carried out the coup on the night of November 18" (82) . It is characteristic that at the beginning the meeting did not go well “and everything could have burst.” Mikhailov asked for a break and prepared the ministers for him. Everything went smoothly” (83). “It’s interesting,” notes G.K. Gins, “that from the Council of Ministers only Shumilovsky objected to the dictatorship /from the government, by the way, who did not leave - M.Sh./. All the ministers, proteges of the Directory, turned out to be supporters of autocracy” (84).

Perhaps the most objective description of what happened in hot pursuit was given by the arrested N.D. Avksentev, V.M. Zenzinov, E.F. Rogovsky, A.A. Argunov, who stated in their statement:

“The coup was carried out not by the population, which was silent, but by a group of people, firmly united for a long time, and agreed among themselves... The names of the main figures are on everyone’s lips, the number and name of their organizations is known to everyone. These are a few right-wing cadet and commercial and industrial circles in close contact with monarchist and officer circles and with part of the former Siberian government, transformed by the will of the Directory into the All-Russian Council of Ministers, which in the very first steps of the Directory in Omsk showed stubborn resistance in its desire to implement sovereign is right, despite his solemn promise of full, not out of fear, but out of conscience, support for this constitutional power created in Ufa” (85).

Thus, our analysis allows us to assert that the creation and activities of the Provisional All-Russian Government (Directory) was an attempt to practically implement the Socialist Revolutionary “coalition of all the main forces” of the country (according to N.D. Avksentyev, V.M. Zenzinov, E.F. Rogovsky, A. A. Argunov) (86). Everything that happened then did not happen according to their scenario, but due to the confluence of a number of factors. The main thing was that by mid-1918, in the context of the outbreak of civil war, the idea of ​​a coalition had exhausted itself, and the opposing forces relied on establishing a dictatorship. The Socialist Revolutionaries finally discredited themselves when they found themselves incapable of current administrative work.

NOTES

1. Boldyrev V. G. Directory. Kolchak. Interventionists. Memories. Novonikolaevsk, 1925, p.517. V. A. Vinogradov, who was ill, took the oath on September 27, and P. V. Vologodsky, who returned from the Far East, took the oath on October 22, 1918.
2. Kerzhentsev V. Military dictatorship and “allies” // News of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, 1918, September 19.
3. GARF, f. 5871, op. 1, d. 109, l. 7.
4. Parfenov P. S. Civil war in Siberia 1918–1920. M., 1925, p. 49; Garmiza V.V. The collapse of the Socialist Revolutionary governments. M., 1970, pp. 199–201; Gusev K.V. Socialist Revolutionary Party: from petty-bourgeois revolutionism to counter-revolution. M., 1975, p. 296; Golinkov D. L. The collapse of the anti-Soviet underground in the USSR. Book 1. M., 1975, p. 219; Ioffe G.Z. The collapse of the Russian monarchical counter-revolution. M., 1977, p. 174.
5. Garmiza V.V. Directory and Kolchak // Questions of history, 1976, N 10, p. 31.
6. Krol L.A. For three years. Memories. Vladivostok, 1922, pp.62–63; Civil war and military intervention in the USSR. Encyclopedia. M., 1983, p. 622; Ioffe G.Z. Kolchak's adventure and its collapse. M., 1983, pp. 92–93.
7. Dumova N. G. Cadet counter-revolution and its defeat. M., 1982, pp. 172–176, 192.
8. SSE, vol. 1, p. 829.
9. Ioffe G.Z. Kolchak's adventure and its collapse. p.91.
10. Dumova N. G. Op. op., pp. 207, 172.
11. Plotnikova M. E. The role of the “Provisional Siberian Government” in the preparation of the Kolchak coup in Siberia // Tr. Tomsk un-ta, t.167, 1964, p.56; Garmiza V.V. The collapse of the Socialist Revolutionary governments. pp.102–103.
12. Ioffe G.Z. The Great October Revolution and the epilogue of tsarism. M., 1987, p. 305.
13. Zhurov Yu. V. Civil war in a Siberian village. Krasnoyarsk, 1986, p. 46.
14. Demidov V. A. October and the national question in Siberia. Novosibirsk, 1987, p. 197.
15. Shilovsky M. V. The first Prime Minister of Siberia (P.V. Vologodsky) // Sib. antiquity, 1993, pp. 2–4.
16. Siberia (Irkutsk), 1907, July 6.
17. Sib. life, 1919, January 14
18. Kolomytseva L. M. Constitutional democrats of Siberia (February 1917 - early 1918). Manuscript of a dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences. Tomsk, 1993, p. 253.
19. Sib. Vestnik (Omsk), 1918, August 30.
20. Dumova N. G. Decree. cit., p.169; Ioffe G.Z. Kolchak’s adventure and its collapse. p.91.
21. GANO, f.p.5, op.2, d.1492, l.9.
22. Cm.: Vibe P. P., Mikheev A. P., Pugacheva N. M. Omsk Dictionary of History and Local Lore. M., 1994, p. 32.
23. Wegman V.D. V.G. Boldyrev and his memories // Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.7.
24. Dyakin V.S. The Russian bourgeoisie and tsarism during the First World War. L., 1967, pp. 42, 43; Dumova N. G. Decree. cit., pp. 22, 172.
25. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.48.
26. Adrianov A.V. On the history of the revolution // Sibirsk. life/, 1918, June 5.
27. Ioffe G.Z. Decree. cit., p.79.
28. Dumova N. G. Decree. cit., p.129.
29. Ioffe G.Z. Decree. cit., p.95.
30. GARF, f. 176, op.14, d.49, l.2.
31. Shilovsky M. V. Omsk events of the last ten days of September 1918 // Questions of the history of Siberia of the twentieth century. Novosibirsk, 1993, p. 31.
32. GANO, f.p.5, op.2, d.148. Protocols No. 1 (September 23), NN 19,20 (October 15, 16) and No. 24 (October 20) are missing. Further, all links to the protocols are given directly in the text, indicating the sheets.
33. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., pp. 93–105.
34. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., pp. 71, 75, 78.
35. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.76.
36. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.54.
37. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.55.
38. GAOO, f.270, op.1, d.332, l.216; Sib. Bulletin, 1918, September 15.
39. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.66.
40. Ioffe G.Z. Decree. cit., p.97.
41. Shilovsky M. V. Decree. cit., p.34.
42. Hover institution Archives, box. 1, p.219.
43. Larkov N. S. Minister of War of White Siberia // Sib. antiquity, 1994, N 4, p. 30.
44. GARF, f.176, op.3, d.12, l.23; People's Siberia (Novonikolaevsk), 1918, September 11.
45. Shilovsky M. V. Decree. cit., p.35.
46. GANO, f.p.5, op.2, d.1492, l.13.
47. Krol L.A. For three years. p.143.
48. GARF, f.193, rp.1, d.12, l.6.
49. GARF, f.5869, op.1, d.15, l.10.
50. Krol L.A. Decree. cit., p.144; Maisky I. Democratic counter-revolution. M., - Pg..1923, p.308; GAOO, f.366, op.1, d.427, l.21.
51. Krol L.A. Decree. cit., p.144.
52. Krol L.A. Decree. cit., p.145.
53. In the official press of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the resolution is published in a different wording: “Prior to the formation... temporary management... shall be entrusted to the relevant ministries of the Provisional Siberian Government” (Siberian Bulletin, 1918, October 16). Those. not “under direct supervision,” but simply “instruct.”
54. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.77.
55. GANO, f.p.5, op.2, d.1568, l.14.
56. G. E. Lvov - head of the first coalition Provisional Government in 1917.
57. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.83.
58. GAOO, f.366, op.1, d.427, l.21.
59. GARF, f.193, op.1, d.12, l.9.
60. Ibid.; Serebrennikov I. I. My memories. vol.1, Tianjin, 1937, p.203.
61. Krol L.A. Decree. cit., p.151.
62. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.86.
63. Right there.
64. Ibid., p.87.
65. Ioffe G.Z. Kolchak's adventure and its collapse. p.102.
66. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.87.
67. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., pp. 87, 88.
68. GARF, f.193, op.1, d.12, l.10.
69. Sib. Bulletin, 1918, November 6.
70. GARF, f.176, op.1, d.96, l.7.
71. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.92.
72. Sib. Bulletin, 1918, November 6; Voice of the People (Tomsk), 1918, November 8.
73. Sib. Bulletin, 1918, August 22, 30, September 13
74. Krol L.A. Decree. cit., p.153.
75. Diary of V. N. Pepelyaev // Red Dawns (Irkutsk), 1923, No. 4, p. 85.
76. The preparation for self-dissolution and the meeting itself on November 10, 1918 are discussed in our article. See: Shilovsky M.V. Siberian representative body: from plans to dramatic finale (January-November 1918) // Siberia during the Civil War. Kemerovo, 1995, pp. 15–16.
77. Boldyrev V. G. Decree. cit., p.90.
78. GANO, f.p.5, op.4, d.708, pp.7–10.
79. Ibid., l.7.
80. Gins G.K. Siberia, allies and Kolchak // Kolchakshchina (From white memoirs). B.M., 1930, p.23.
81. Ioffe G.Z. Decree. cit., pp. 115–117.
82. Diary of V.N. Pepelyaev, p.88.
83. Gins G.K. Decree. cit., p.23.
84. GANO, f.p.5, op.4, d.708, l.5.
85. Ibid., l.6.

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Western Ukrainian People's Republic.

State revival in Western Ukrainian lands - in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia - took place separately, but under the strong influence of events taking place in Eastern Ukraine. Since September 1918, anticipating the imminent collapse of Austria-Hungary, Ukrainians in Galicia were preparing to take power into their own hands. At the end of September, a Military Committee, which was soon headed by a centurion Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS) Dmitry Vitovsky.

On October 18, 1918, a meeting of Ukrainian deputies in the Austrian parliament, as well as representatives of Ukrainian parties and public organizations, was organized in Lvov. Was created here Ukrainian National Rada (UNRada), of which he became chairman Evgeniy Petrushevich. On October 30, Ukrainian representatives in the Austrian parliament demanded that the Austrian authorities transfer all power in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia to the hands of the UNRada, to which the Austrian authorities refused. Then, on the night of November 1, the Military Committee, which consisted of about 1,500 soldiers and officers, disarmed all non-Ukrainian soldiers in Lvov and seized important government buildings. This action was also carried out in other cities of Galicia. Gradually, German and Austrian units began to leave Galicia.

On November 9, 1918, UNRada determined the name for the new state - Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR). The first government was created - State Commissariat, who headed Kost Levitsky. The Western Ukrainian People's Republic included a territory of about 70,000 sq. km, where 6 million people lived. 75% of them were Ukrainians. From the very beginning, the Poles took an openly hostile position and began an armed struggle against the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. On November 21, Ukrainian units were forced to leave Lviv. The government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic moved to Ternopil.

Having come to power, the Directory issued a declaration on December 26, 1918 on the renewal of the laws of the UPR and on the transfer of landowners' land to peasants without redemption. On the same day, the directory appointed its first government, which was headed by Vladimir Chekhovskoy, which included representatives of Ukrainian socialist parties. Immediately after coming to power, the directory had problems. Entente troops were advancing from the south. In addition, there was the question of merging the UPR with the WUNR. The Red Army was advancing from the north. At this time it was decided to convene Labor Congress- a kind of parliament, which was subsequently supposed to choose the central government. Only peasants, workers and the working intelligentsia had to choose, as a result of which many perceived it as a version of the Bolshevik.

On January 23 - 28, 1919, a session of the Labor Congress took place in Kyiv. It approved the act of unification of the UPR and WUNR. Legislative and supreme power was temporarily transferred to the Directory. Universal suffrage was also approved. Due to the Bolshevik offensive, the session was interrupted. At this time, the situation of the UPR was critical. The Red Army was advancing from the east and north. Denikin's white army threatened from the Don. Beyond the Dniester were the Romanians. The Poles threatened from the west and the Entente troops from the south. The armed forces of the UPR were extremely weak and poorly organized. On February 5, the Ukrainian government left Kyiv. And in March, UPR troops stopped the Red Army’s advance to the west, the goal of which was to break through to the aid of the communist government Bela Kuny in Hungary.

At this time, the Directory tried to find a common language with the Entente countries. But even after making significant concessions, she could not find understanding with them. The Entente helped Denikin's White Army, which wanted to revive the Great Russian Empire. Ukrainian units suffered defeats from the Red Army and were forced to retreat to the west of Ukraine. Here in June - July the UPR army was reorganized, and then the WUNR army joined it - UGA (Ukrainian Galician Army). In August 1919, a joint campaign of the UPR and UGA armies began in the direction of Kyiv and Odessa. At first, the offensive developed successfully; the Bolsheviks were expelled from the territory of the Right Bank. But, having encountered units of the White Army in Kyiv, Ukrainian troops retreated from Kyiv. Denikin’s people treated the UPR with contempt and considered all Ukrainians to be separatists. On the occupied lands they restored landownership.

On September 15, the Directory transferred all powers to Simon Petlyura, and on September 24 declared war on Denikin’s army. The military campaign against Denikin was difficult and unequal. Fiercely resisting, Ukrainian troops slowly retreated to the west. In addition, the leadership of the UGA signed an agreement with Denikin’s army on the entry of the UGA into Denikin’s formations. In November 1919, Polish units advanced from the west. At a meeting of members of the UPR government, it was decided to switch to partisan methods of struggle. Part of the UPR army marched into the so-called Winter hike in the rear of the Red and White Army. The campaign lasted about six months and in May parts of the UPR broke through to the west. By this point, the Bolsheviks had defeated Denikin's army and were moving west. On April 22, between the Polish government and the government of the UPR, headed by Symon Petliura, a Warsaw Pact, according to which Poland recognized the UPR, but Poland received some Ukrainian lands. It was a forced decision. At the same time, a joint Ukrainian-Polish offensive began. Already on May 7, joint troops entered Kyiv. However, soon, under the pressure of the red units, they were forced to retreat to the west. The red units rushed to the west to bring the world revolution to Europe at bayonets. But on September 15, Polish units, with the participation of Ukrainian units, defeated the Red Horsemen and launched a counter-offensive. Ukrainian troops advanced further and further east. But the Poles began negotiations with the Russian communists and, having obtained territorial concessions from them (at the expense of Ukrainian territory), concluded a truce. The communists transferred troops and drove the UPR army into the territory of new Poland, where the Ukrainians were interned. In 1921, some Ukrainian military personnel attempted the Second Winter Campaign across the territory of Soviet Ukraine. However, some of them were captured and on November 23, near the Bazaar, 359 participants in the campaign were shot. Thus ended the period of the Ukrainian state of 1917-1920. Ukraine was divided between Soviet Russia and Poland. Some Ukrainian lands became part of Czechoslovakia and Romania.